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.e. with a certain sense and with a certain reference. That is, in this sense, when somebody says “Morning”, we can ask a question like “what did he do?” instead of “what did he say?” And the answer would be that he produced a sound, word or sentence-“Morning!” The act performed in this sense is dubbed a locutionary act. By itself the first sense is an uninteresting, or trivial, observation, but it leads us to something interesting and important. That is, as Austin said, “in performing a locutionary act we shall also be performing such an act as: asking or answering a question, giving some information or an assurance or a warning, announcing a verdict or an intention, pronouncing sentence, making an appointment or an appeal pr a criticism, making an identification or giving a description, and the numerous like”. For example, to the question “what did he do?” when the person concerned said “Morning!” we could perfectly well answer “he offered a greeting.” In other words, when we speak, we not only produce some units of language w ith certain meaning, but also make clear our purpose in producing them, the way we intend them to be understood, or they also have certain forces as Austin prefers to say. In the example of “Morning!” we can say it has the force of a greeting, or it ought to have been taken as a greeting. This is the second sense in which to say something is to do something, and the act performed is known as the illocutionary act. The third sense in which to say something can mean to do something concerns the consequential effects of a locution upon the hearer. By telling somebody something the speaker may change the opinion of the hearer on something, or mislead him, or surprise him, or induce him to do something, or what not. Whether or not these effects are intended, they can be considered as part of the act that the speaker has performed. This act is called perlocutionary, as it is performed through, by means of, a locutionary act. Even though, from a pragmatic point of view, the perlocutionary effect perhaps is the most interesting aspect of speech acting (since it may tell us something about people’s motivation for using a particular speech act), illocutionary force is what has occupied speech act theorizers most. In this connection, the conditions that must obtain before a speech act can be said to have a particular illocutionary force (or ‘count as’ a particular speech acts) have been the object of much discussion. These are often called ‘felicity conditions’: there must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances, and further, the particular person and circumstances in given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoke. All participants both must execute the procedure correctly completely. Where, as often, the procedure is designed for us by persons having certain thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part of any participant, then a person participating in and so invoking the procedure must in fact have those thought or feeling, and the participants must intend so to conduct themselves, and further must actually so conduct themselves subsequently. Here is an example: Heinze: Can you imagine us in London? Rick: When you get there, ask me First of all, we have to be certain that a person enunc