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argues that social desirability to evade taxes and detection efforts by government are subjected to acceptability of tax laws. Economists use various approaches to assess tax laws however, (Vihanto, 2003) judges tax to be good in terms with morality. Here author means that 'members of a community would give their consent to the tax voluntarily if they had to choose without knowing any particulars of their circumstances' (Vihanto, 2003, p.112).

In presence of such a social contract, evasion is undesirable because this means violation of social agreement and rights. (Vihanto, 2003) views tax compliance decision as a consequence following rules that proved to benefit in past. A policy outcome by (Vihanto, 2003) is that government laws should be diligently applied so honest taxpayers don't feel injustice or cheated.

(Kim, 2008) talks about political intention and analyzes its effects tax evasion. Author is of view that tax evasion has remained concern of many but not much has been done in direction of political factors. This paper examines relationship between sovereign government and tax authority and thus reflects the way tax evasion is influenced by government's intention to control it. Unemployment and inflation have been described as main tools through which government controls political business cycle.

(Kim, 2008) argues that if politicians have incentive to affect economy then they can do this by antitrust laws, regulations and tax auditing. (Kim, 2008) suggests that tax authority in many countries comes from ruling party and hence, politically powerful can influence tax administration indirectly. However, in case of developed nations, author thinks that politician find it extremely difficult to effect economy using tax auditing. (Kim, 2008) has identified price controls, public service, litigation against government, administrative regulation and tax rates as important variables. The results show that political intention of sovereign government does impacts tax evasion.

Tax evasion, fiscal operations and underdevelopment 逃税、财政运营和不发达

(Panadés, 2001) investigates if ricardian equivalence holds in presence of tax evasion or not. As distribution of future income is controlled by agents through income reporting, uncertainty becomes endogenous. Ricardian equivalence suggest that timing of tax changes does not impact consumption decisions when government's budget constraint is internalized by consumers. (Panadés, 2001) has review literature to analyze if this proposition holds under uncertainty of future income. From review of literature, author concludes that uncertainty tends to be exogenous. This is inconsistent with authors own model that assumes it to be endogenous as individuals control uncertainty through reported income that determines distribution of future income. (Panadés, 2001) assumes a two period model where young individual decides amount of reported income and income saved. Here uncertainty arises due to fact that individual will have to pay fines from savings if he is caught in future. Findings suggest that ricardian equivalence does not hold if penalties are proportional to the amount of unreported income while it holds when penalties are proportional to tax amount evaded. (Panadés, 2001) supposes that higher tax rate means more tax evasion and thus more uncertainty in second period as a consequence of income gap between audited and unaudited taxpa