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interest. [6] The first three interests were accorded to the accused. The goal of these interests was to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation and to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself. [7] The accused therefore has certain guarantees if there is a swift carriage of justice. Additionally, the society stands to gain from the occurrence of a speedy trial. According to Code, if the courts are able to deal with cases in a prompt manner and reduce the backlog of cases, accused persons will be less able to have their charges lessened and are unlikely to manipulate the system [8] . Admittedly, the aim of the courts is to balance these interests to ensure that all involved is protected.

The court in Bell recognized the importance of this task and purported to follow a guideline that would address these interests. Thus, the first criterion postulated by Powell J in Barker v Wingo was the length of the delay. Significantly, a mere delay will not constitute a breach of the defendant’s right to a fair hearing within a reasonable time. The delay has to be to the detriment of the accused as per Powell J, “[it has to be] presumptively prejudicial” [9] and would negate the possibility of him/her receiving a fair trial. This was emphasized in Bell, that the accused may have his rights breached even though he is unable to identify any specific prejudice. The second criterion that may be considered is the reasons given by the prosecution to justify the delay. Thirdly, the responsibility of the accused for asserting his rights was advanced by the court, namely did the accused complain about the abuse of his rights, how frequently did he do so and would it be futile even if he had done so. Finally, there is the criterion of whether there was prejudice to the accused. The court has identified three such interests: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. [10]

However, it is imperative to note that a fair trial within a reasonable time is not an absolute right. The Privy Council in Bell pointed out that it was the duty of the courts of Jamaica to ensure that in its task to obtain justice, the individual’s fundamental right of a fair hearing and the public interest are equally protected within the social, economic and political context existing in Jamaica. Ultimately, it is up to the courts of Jamaica to determine whether the right to a fair hearing has been breached.

Significantly, Flowers v R [11] demonstrates that a mere delay will not constitute a breach of the accused right to a fair hearing within a reasonable time. In this case, the appellant was charged with capital murder in April 1991. His first trial was in 1992 where the jury disagreed. This resulted in a new trial being ordered. At the second trial in 1994, the jury also disagreed. The appellant was convicted at his third trial in 1997 for murder and was sentenced to death. The defense contributed to some of the delay. The appellant did not raise the issue that his constitutional right to a fair hearing had been breached either at his trial or during his appeal to the Court of Appeal. Flowers v R purported to follow the criteria laid down in Bell v Director of Public Prosecutor an