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hysical objects – they are the physical objects. Talk of external physical objects is ‘heuristic shorthand’ for (a convenient way of speaking of) a complex conjunction of propositions about my (yours, and everybody’s) actual and/or hypothetical sense data given an equally complex (to articulate) set of conditions. In general, a reductionist solution to an inferential problem is one that reduces the putative conclusion to (i.e. renders the conclusion’s semantic content as logically equivalent to) the best evidence we can cite for it, thereby closing the gap between premise(s) and conclusion.

• Phenomenalism as one example of Reductionism. Phenomenalism was originally generally called Idealism, reflecting an old use of the word ‘idea’ to mean any item that has a purely mental existence, prior to the present more restrictive use which limits ‘idea’ to a mental item which is conceptual or intellectual in character. It was first developed by the Irish philosopher (and bishop) George Berkeley (1685 – 1753). He based his ‘proof’ of God’s existence on it, contending that the doctrine that God created independently existing physical objects which cause our sense impressions of them was blasphemous (‘the Deity has no need of an instrument’). It was embraced in secular fashion by the logical positivists, an influential group of anti-metaphysical pro-physical sciences group of epistemologists known as the Vienna Circle (Wiener Kreis) (circa 1907 -1938). Mostly Jewish, or Marxist, or both, they dispersed, generally to the US, some to the UK, with Hitler’s ascendancy. Influential members/followers included Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap, Kurt Gödel, Sir Karl Popper, Moritz Schlick, Friedrich Waisman, and Herbert Feigl. (Many later became leading critics of Marxism.) Their reductionist spirit is expressed in their widely shared principle that, “to understand the meaning of a statement, ask what observations would verify it or falsify it”; if none would, then it is a pseudo-statement – something with the form of a statement but without any real content; we are deluded by its grammatical form into falsely assuming it to be meaningful. All statements of religion and metaphysics are of this character, i.e. they are nonsensical – they fail “the verification principle”.

• Behaviourism as a Reductionist Solution to the Problems of Mind. There are two classical problems about mind – a metaphysical problem (What is mind?) and a double-barrelled epistemological problem: (a) How do I know that what goes on in your mind (e.g. when you say you experience a sense datum of a red patch, or feel a sensation of pain) is qualitatively similar to what goes on in my mind when I report these experiences?; and (b) How do I know that anyone in the universe other than me has a mind at all? We attribute mental life to another and/or specific mental states to that other on the basis of observable behaviour. But there is a gap between the behavioural evidence and the mental states that we attribute, justifying these attributions by the behaviour. How do we know the inference is successful? We can never get behind the other’s behaviour to perceive the mental states of that other directly, therefore confirming the soundness of the inference. Scepticism about the mental life of everyone except me is a consequence.

• Parallel between Behaviourism and Phenomenalism. The behaviourists (e.g. Oxford philosopher Gilbert Ryle (190本论文由英语论文网提供整理，提供论文代写，英语论文代写，代写论文，代写英语论文，代写留学生论文，代写英文论文，留学生论文代写相关核心关键词搜索。