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ntly, by saying that working scientists were methodologically sloppy. They don’t do things by the book! But this was soon recognised as too harsh. If the hypothesis was a cherished hypothesis, which fitted in beautifully with an otherwise very successful theory, working scientists were very reluctant to let it go. So they put the unsuccessful predictions down as anomalies, pointing to the need, when more is known, to refine the hypothesis somewhat – though exactly how and exactly why remained open questions, to be the subject of future research. (So one sees in the scientific literature papers with titles like ‘An Attempt to Explain the XYZ Anomaly and a proposed Modification of the XYZ Hypothesis.’
The subject of revision and abandonment of hypotheses is one to which we will return later in the course.)

In sum, the hypothetico-deductive method involves:
(1) Observation and recording of data in the field (and/or the laboratory)
(2) Noting of a common quality or characteristic (Source: observation and measurement)
(2) Formulation of a general hypothesis under which the data can be subsumed (Source: hunch) – nature of step, induction.
(3) Derivation of predictions from the hypothesis – nature of step, deductive.
(4)  Testing of the predictions (Source: observation and measurement.)

4. The Justification of Induction

Manifestly, we commonly employ inductive reasoning. In induction, we commonly argue from the presence of a characteristic in a sample from a class, to a conclusion that predicates that characteristic of every member of the class. But what justifies us in taking that step? A general answer is: In the past whenever we have generalised from the presence of a characteristic in a (large, diverse, and representative) sample of a class, to the presence of that characteristic in every member of the class, we have been more often right than wrong.

But this simply shifts the problem. It now becomes: why does the fact that, following a particular method in the past has more often than not been followed in the past by what has turned out to be a correct conclusion justify us in thinking that, on this occasion, following that method will, more likely than not, yield a correct result?

In other words, how does the fact that something has proven to be a fairly reliable method in the past of predicting the future, have the slightest tendency to prove that, on this occasion, following that method will more likely than not be successful in predicting the future?

We make this assumption all the time, in both everyday common sensical reasoning and serious scientific reasoning. But, according to the Enlightenment Scottish empiricist philosopher David Hume (1711 – 1776) it is a method that cannot be justified. It cannot be justified deductively (or, as Hume expresses it, by demonstrative or a priori reasoning), nor cannot it be justified inductively (or, as Hume expresses it, by moral reasoning). Any attempt to justify it inductively is doomed to be a case of begging the question. In other words to use an inductive argument to legitimize the use of inductive arguments would be to assume exactly what has to be proved!

So, are we driven, once again, to scepticism? Are we doomed to acknowledge that the reasoning we use to justify most of our conclusions cannot be justified?

One attempt to avoid this outcome is modelled on the way in which the Oxford Absolute本论文由英语论文网提供整理，提供论文代写，英语论文代写，代写论文，代写英语论文，代写留学生论文，代写英文论文，留学生论文代写相关核心关键词搜索。