新巴塞尔协议的主要内容和对我国商业银行风险监管的影响 [2]
论文作者:www.51lunwen.org论文属性:短文 essay登出时间:2013-10-29编辑:yangcheng点击率:5686
论文字数:1358论文编号:org201310240858383977语种:英语 English地区:中国价格:免费论文
关键词:新巴塞尔协议主要内容商业银行风险监管影响
摘要:中国的商业银行在改善信息披露制度的过程中,监管当局应支付注意规范寻找,充分考虑了国际最新潮流,为了保持一定的提前,以避免盲目跟风,并始终处于落后的局面。随着越来越多的重视,近年来,“巴塞尔市场风险和操作风险,内部系统的作用越来越重视,我们应该也与此有关,在信息披露的要求规范更专注于内部系统的描述和评价。
s of their size , should be based on its balance-sheet and off-balance sheet business, the nature , complexity and degree of risk management to establish an effective internal control system, which must be based on the bank 's operating environment and changes in operating conditions and make the appropriate response and regulate the banks to implement the oversight mechanisms. At the same time , the legal system in the regulatory risk , should draw new " core principles " of the relevant provisions of the regulatory body should be clearly regulated commercial banks to implement the effectiveness of internal control mechanism or not . Regulatory authorities must be satisfied that : commercial banks to establish on capital adequacy, credit risk, market risk , liquidity risk , operational risk, interest rate risk in a bank account
New agreements have an important regulatory philosophy , that is incentive compatible . The so-called incentive-compatible financial regulation , the emphasis is not just financial regulation starting from the regulatory objectives set regulatory measures , but should refer to the financial institution 's business objectives , internal management of financial institutions and market discipline into the regulatory scope of this guide two forces to support the regulatory goals. Based solely on the regulatory objectives , without regard to the interests and development of financial institutions supervision , supervision of incentive incompatibility is the basic features . Incentive incompatibility regulation, must compel commercial banks to pay a huge cost of regulatory compliance , loss of profit opportunities to open up new markets , and often have serious moral hazard problem . Regulatory agencies because it is not timely manner to the changing needs of the financial markets to make a timely response to a financial institution disincentive to innovation . Therefore, the development of the global financial regulatory framework has been increasingly focused on incentive compatibility , emphasizing the business objectives of financial institutions and regulatory agencies regulatory objectives of coherence and coordination . Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan on incentive-compatible regulation made a brief definition : that should be incentive-compatible regulatory compliance , rather than against the investors and bank managers profit maximization objective supervision. The so-called incentive-compatible regulation is actually more in financial supervision in the introduction of market mechanisms . From the international scope of view, in the 20th century , 80 years ago , the market mechanism and the relationship between government regulators actually understand the relationship into a parallel alternative , strengthen financial supervision powers means weakening the power of the market mechanism , thus formation of financial supervision of financial markets repressive features .
With the global market trend of development in the concept of incentive compatibility under the supervision of financial market regulation is no longer a substitute , but microeconomic foundation to strengthen the means of financial institutions , financial regulation does not want to replace the market mechanism within certain ranges , while only from the unique perspective of intervention financial operations , and promote stable and efficient operation of the financial system . Incentive-comp
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