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Our sample consists of 1,431 venture deals from 124 venture capital firms in 17 European countries. Our primary data source is a comprehensive survey of all venture capital firms in these countries. We augmented the data with numerous secondary sources, include in commercial databases and websites. This data collection effort required considerable time and effort but allowed us to gather a dataset that has several unique advantages. The dataset is considerably larger than other hand-collected datasets on venture capital, and is much richer than the commercially available databases; it also contains a significant number of investments that cross different legal systems. Moreover, it allows us to introduce to the literature a novel measure of the intensity of interactions between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs, a measure that cannot be obtained from standard sources of venture capital data (such as Venture pert), nor from venture capital contracts.

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