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hich accurately reflects its correct usage, captures the essence of whatever it is that has been defined. The word ‘essence’ is decreasingly used because of its historical metaphysical use in which the essence of a thing was thought to in some way inhabit the thing and actually make it the sort of thing it is! Insofar as it is used today, it is for all practical purposes the same as connotation.

Back to theories. Given all those things we gave as examples of theories at the start, can we capture the connotation of the word ‘theory’? (Or in old-speak, can we formulate the essence of a theory?) I have never seen it done. If that is right, does that mean that the word ‘theory’ is ambiguous? Not necessarily; indeed in this case probably not. When a word is ambiguous it usually has two (or more) sharply differentiated meanings. Take the noun ‘bank’ for example. There is no continuity between a bank in the sense of the side of a river, and a bank in the sense of a financial institution. Indeed the fact that English uses the same word for both is a historical accident. The word ‘bank’ in the sense of a financial institution is (probably) French in origin (spelling notwithstanding). But in the sense of the side of a river, it is Anglo-Saxon. They have completely different linguistic pedigrees. While this is not necessarily the case when a word is ambiguous, it is often the case. It is certainly not the case for the word ‘theory’.

To help us understand what might have been going on with the word ‘theory’ I would like to introduce you to a concept first introduced by the Austrian-born Cambridge philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889 -1951), namely, the concept of a family resemblance term. He illustrated this concept by reference to the example of the word ‘game’. Consider all the things we call games. Some can be played alone, some in pairs, some in large teams. Some are paid for relaxation, some are played seriously (e.g. the Olympic Games) and some are played for commercial profit (e.g. professional golf). Some are governed by a body of rules, some are not (e.g. a solitary child playing a game with a ball.) Wittgenstein’s contention was that, try as you may, you will find nothing that is both common to, and peculiar too, all and only things properly called games. (Try it!) It follows that the word ‘game’ is incapable of a lexical definition. But it is not an ambiguous word. Wittgenstein calls it a family resemblance term because there is a resemblance between games which is like the family resemblance among family members of the same sanguinity. There is the characteristic nose (but Cousin Willy and Aunt Flossy do not share it); there is the distinctive brow (but Uncle Henry and Cousin Katie are different … and so on). If you scan the family portrait, you get a sense of the family resemblance; indeed it often jumps out at you, but there are no characteristics such that they are both common to and peculiar to every member of the family.

Here is an abstracted way of how this works for language. Suppose a community has been using the word W for (1) things with properties A, B, C, and D. But then something comes along (2) that is B, C, D, and E – it is natural to call it a W also as it has most of its properties in common with (1). But then they encounter something (3) with properties C, D, E, and F, and so call it W also. Then later they find something (4) which is D, E, F, and G, so it is naturally called W as well. Then t本论文由英语论文网提供整理，提供论文代写，英语论文代写，代写论文，代写英语论文，代写留学生论文，代写英文论文，留学生论文代写相关核心关键词搜索。