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ged, and bankruptcies are usually the common end result. This is because, once the producer is not trusted, Muslim consumers would not purchase the products from that producer (ie. boycott) and this could also be expected to create a ripple effect on the other (non-Muslim) consumers, similar to the cycle described by Liebie (2002) in Sub-Section 3.3.1A. Halal certificate would also be withdrawn if the production premise is not up to the certification standard, such as safety and cleanliness which would affect the products quality. This indicates that the level of monitoring must be adequate.

3.4.3. Monitoring of Labelling

For a credence good (organic) market to be efficient, McCluskey (2000) suggest that it is necessary for a third-party agency to monitor the claims made by the producers. Moreover, there is a need for standardisation on the meaning and the term ‘organic' as this would reduce the cost of monitoring and enforcement (McCluskey, 2000). This is true in the sense of the term Halal, as there are many different criteria of Halal with different organisations which granted Halal certifications. Study by Fischer (n.d.) also shows that many British Muslims and organisations call upon the state to help recognise and standardised Halal. Nonetheless, for simplicity of the analysis of this paper (in Chapter 4), producers are assumed to be honest by introducing labels of true quality, eliminating the need for monitoring.

In relation to organic foods as a credence good, McCluskey (2000) suggested producers may signal by allowing consumers to visit their premises to inspect production process. On the other hand, producers may obtain labels from a credible third-party agency, hence the labels act as a guarantee (McCluskey, 2000). The use of third-party labelling agency can be considered as costly compared to self-labelling by producers themselves, nonetheless, the later is considered as cheap talk (Baksi and Bose, 2007; Farrell, 1993, in McCluskey 2000), as no third-party to monitor their activities. Nonetheless, self-labelling is sufficient presumably where producers are honest in their actions, which is the case in the analysis of this paper.

Furthermore, McCluskey (2000) claimed that if there is no monitoring for credence good, there would be no premium for claiming organic or high-quality products. However in practice, consumers are willing to pay a premium for these products even if there is no monitoring (especially if they are self-labelled) as consumers have some degree of trusting the producers, until legitimately proven wrong. The following final section discusses the limitations of the solutions to market failure of credence goods.

3.5. Limitations of the Solutions

There are a number of limitations emerge around the solutions of inefficiency in credence goods market themselves. The solutions which are supposed to reduce inefficiency could become a ‘double-edged sword' if not treated well. The following sub-section briefly discussed some of them.

3.5.1. Inefficient Monitoring

A study suggests that it could be economically effective in reducing search time and correcting asymmetric information that may exis本论文由英语论文网提供整理，提供论文代写，英语论文代写，代写论文，代写英语论文，代写留学生论文，代写英文论文，留学生论文代写相关核心关键词搜索。