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Since then, lots of scholars have devoted themselves to the analysis of so-called “East Asian Miracle”. Some paid attention to the state-led and condensed industrialization with unlimited supply of highly educated laborers, while others stressed the traditional Asian values, i.e., Confucian ideologies. Anyway, what was most striking at that time was that East Asia had emerged as the potential force that could threaten the supreme power of the West. To be sure, only the “tigers” could successfully break with the past, thus inspiring emulation in the rest of the Asian countries that, in the 1990s, seem to be following a similar path, albeit under different conditions, and with somewhat different policies, precisely because the development of the “tigers” changed the context in which they were operating, establishing the new Pacific connection to the global economy (Castells, 1998: 245).

In response to the rise of East Asia, the West embarked on the technological development and structural transformation in between 1980s and 1990s. To boost productivity via innovation and adoption of new technologies, they should endure the severe experience of organizational change and downsizing. Without transformation, there could be no prosperity, at all. And at last, they reappeared on the stage of global constellation in late 1990s.

But conversely, such pressure of the new transformational tides poured East Asian and Southeast Asian countries from all quarters, mainly from the West who held up the band of neo-liberalism. And in so far as much as East Asian countries have been enjoying the fruits of economic growth, they should be suffered from the merciless attack of western casino capitalism in later 1990s. Certainly, one of the causes of late 1990s' financial crisis in the East Asian countries was the end result of the negligence of such structural transformations. Already in the early 1990s, The World Bank and some scholars (Leibziger & Petri, 1993, & Krugman, 1994) warned that the economic growth in some advanced and middle-level developing countries in East and Southeast Asian countries was owing to the increased input of production factors such as capital and labor, without any accompanying technological change and productivity.

Exchange rates in Indonesia and, to a lesser extent, South Korea have appreciated since the middle of 1998.

Equity prices in the emerging market economies have strengthened considerably since the beginning of 1999. The gains in Asia have been particularly strong.

Figure 4.1 and 4.2 is showing the sudden impact blown on East Asia and Southeast Asian Countries. Of course, Feldstein (1998) has severely criticized the IMF, on the ground that South Korea was not the case of solvency but was only a reflection of temporary liquidity crisis, and Sachs (1997), by using the same initial of “International Monetary Fund”, ridiculed the IMF policy as “International Monetary Failure”. Furthermore, Wade and Veneroso (1998) argue as follows: “While showing generosity to the Indonesian crony capitalism of Suharto, IMF authority treats South Korea in a peculiarly harsh manner. It reflects the pressure from the Wall Street-Treasure-IMF Complex”.

Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea were struck by the shortage of liquidity in the year 1997. In case of Thailand, the economy started to slow down from almost two-digit growth since the