电子货币:新的一天或者假黎明-Electronic Money: New Day or False Dawn [14]
论文作者:英语论文论文属性:课程作业 Coursework登出时间:2014-05-07编辑:caribany点击率:24376
论文字数:12223论文编号:org201405061752588441语种:英语 English地区:中国价格:免费论文
关键词:电子货币Electronic MoneyElectronic commerce电子商务Electronic Payments
摘要:预期电子货币的时代,虽然在当今迅速全球化的世界经济中是一个完全自然的发展,但确实对货币政策的有效性产生了深远的影响。随着电子货币的到来,货币创造将日益私有化。
eases and even hyperinflation. Technically, seigniorage derives from the fact that the central bank pays no interest on its liabilities while earning interest on its assets. The difference is pure profit for the monetary authority. As such, seigniorage is not necessarily inflationary. But it obviously can become an "inflation tax" on the general population if money creation is not curbed in some way. For Hayek (1990), the surest way to curb inflation was through the discipline of market competition. Macroeconomic performance would be improved, he contended, if state control of money could be wholly erased, instead leaving currencies to be created solely by private financial institutions. Following his lead, others have argued forcefully for a system of effectively deterritorialized money shaped exclusively by market forces (13) -- denationalized money, to use Hayek's own label.
Little evidence exists, however, to indicate that unrestricted currency competition would necessarily produce better outcomes than traditional central banks; and there is much evidence to suggest that results could be much worse, were rivalry for seigniorage to lead to even greater inflationary pressures. The real problem lies in the underlying character of financial markets, which of course includes the market for money. Inherent in all financial markets, as Charles Kindelberger (1989) has classically demonstrated, is an interdependence of expectations that tends to lead to both herd behavior and multiple equilibria, making the economy painfully vulnerable to manias, panics, and crashes - precisely the sorts of instabilities that central banks were invented to restrain. The challenge to the autonomy of monetary policy is not at all inconsequential.
In fact, the challenge of deterritorialization represents a fundamental change in the nature of monetary governance - a transformation that I have previously characterized as the equivalent of a market shift from monopoly to oligopoly (Cohen 1998). Despite their loss of exclusive control of money supply, their local monopolies, states do still retain an ability to influence nominal demand insofar as they can successfully compete, inside or across borders, to sustain use of their own currency rather than others; that is, insofar as they are able and willing to fight for market share, not unlike rival firms in an oligopolistic industry. With deterritorialization, therefore, monetary management is qualitatively transformed. Where once the link with aggregate expenditures could be taken for granted, now use of a currency must be cultivated and preserved. Where once central banks felt they could act with unquestioned authority, now they are impelled to develop and implement diverse marketing strategies designed to shape and manage demand for money.
Monetary policy, in short, has become something akin to a contest for market loyalty. The targets of policy are the users of money, at home or abroad. The aim of policy is to sustain or enhance a national currency's use, almost as if monies were like goods to be sold under registered trademarks. As economist Robert Aliber once quipped, "the dollar and Coca-Cola are both brand names.... Each national central bank produces its own brand of money... Each national money is a differentiated product... Each central bank has a marketing
strategy to strengthen the demand for its particular brand of money" (Aliber 1987: 153). Demand may be encourage
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