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業務包含在其他主險項下)，在這張計算浮存金的表中， (相對於收到的保費收入，我們持有的浮存金部位算是相當大的) 我們將所有的損失準 備、損失費用調整準備、再保預先收取的資金與未賺取保費加總後，再扣除應付佣金、 預付購併成本、預付稅負以及取得再保業務的相關遞延費用後，所得出浮存金的數額， 不要緊張，這不是什麼考試! Yearend Float (in $ millions) Year GEICO General Re Other Reinsurance Other Primary Total 1967 　 　 　 20 20 1977 　 　 40 131 171 1987 　 　 701 807 1,508 1997 2,917 　 4,014 455 7,386 1998 3,125 14,909 4,305 415 22,754 1999 3,444 15,166 6,285 403 25,298 2000 3,943 15,525 7,805 598 27,871 　　　　　We’re pleased by the growth in our float during 2000 but not happy with its cost. Over the years, our cost of float has been very close to zero, with the underwriting profits realized in most years offsetting the occasional terrible year such as 1984, when our cost was a staggering 19%. In 2000, however, we had an underwriting loss of $1.6 billion, which gave us a float cost of 6%. Absent a mega-catastrophe, we expect our float cost to fall in 2001 - perhaps substantially - in large part because of corrections in pricing at General Re that should increasingly be felt as the year progresses. On a smaller scale, GEICO may experience the same improving trend. 對於2000年的浮存金成長我們感到相當欣慰，但卻對其成本不甚滿意，一直以 來，我們浮存金成本通常都維持在接近於零的低水準，有時好的時候，還能享有 可觀的承保利益，來彌補像1984年那樣糟糕的年度，當年的資金成本高達 19%，不過2000年我們的承保損失卻高達16億美金，這使得我們的浮存金成 本飆高至6%，除非再發生什麼重大的災難，否則我們預期2001年的浮存金成 本將會大幅下降，主要的原因是General RE已經逐漸開始反映調整價格，至於 GEICO雖然規模較小，但也應該會有同樣的情形。 　　　　　There are two factors affecting our cost of float that are very rare at other insurers but that now loom large at Berkshire. First, a few insurers that are currently experiencing large losses have offloaded a significant portion of these on us in a manner that penalizes our current earnings but gives us float we can use for many years to come. After the loss that we incur in the first year of the policy, there are no further costs attached to this business. 相較於其他保險同業，Berkshire現在有兩項相當罕見但卻越來越重要的因素影 響到其浮存金的成本，第一是部份同業目前正面臨相當嚴重的承保損失，迫使我 們必須跟著分攤，而影響到我們短期的盈餘表現，但另一方面也讓我們在未來幾 年有更多的浮存金可以運用，而在保單第一年的損失發生過後，以後年度將不會 再有這方面的成本。 　　　　　When these policies are properly priced, we welcome the pain-today, gain-tomorrow effects they have. In 1999, $400 million of our underwriting loss (about 27.8% of the total) came from business of this kind and in 2000 the figure was $482 million (34.4% of our loss). We have no way of predicting how much similar business we will write in the future, but what we do get will typically be in large chunks. Because these transactions can materially distort our figures, we will tell you about them as they occur. 只要保單的價格合理，我們樂於接受這類先苦後甘的結果，在1999年所有的承 保損失當中，有4億美元(約佔總損失的27.8%)是來自於這類的業務，至於2000 年則有4.82億美元(約佔總損失的34.4%)，我們無法預測以後每年能夠接到多 少這類的業務，不過只要有案件金額通常都不小，而也由於這類的交易往往會嚴 重影響到我們的損益數字，所以只要發生我一定會向各位報告。 　　　　　Other reinsurers have little taste for this insurance. They simply can’t stomach what huge underwriting losses do to their reported results, even though these losses are produced by policies whose overall economics are certain to be favorable. You should be careful, therefore, in comparing our underwriting results with those of other insurers. 其他再保業者對這類業務往往沒有多大興趣，因為他們根本就無法接受其財務報 表突然出現重大的損失，即便可以確定這類業務長期的結果都相當不錯，所以各 位在拿我們的數字跟其他同業做比較時，要特別注意這一點。 　　　　　An even more significant item in our numbers - which, again, you won’t find much of elsewhere - arises from transactions in which we assume past losses of a company that wants to put its troubles behind it. To illustrate, the XYZ insurance 本论文由英语论文网提供整理，提供论文代写，英语论文代写，代写论文，代写英语论文，代写留学生论文，代写英文论文，留学生论文代写相关核心关键词搜索。