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1.1. Background
在后安然时代，公司治理显著突出显示，其应用在实践中不断强调。公司治理不仅是建立一个治理结构，不同参与者之间分配的责任和权利，同时也阐述程序和规则来决定企业事务，包括对财务报表经理的会计判断（LA Portaet人，2000年）。然而，可能是金融statementsare被操纵，以实现基于代理理论（Dulipovici和罗比，2013年）managers'self-利益。因此，这样的理论论据发出警报，调查经理的会计选择的动机，并承认对财务业绩的影响相对应。In the post-Enron era, Corporate Governance is significantly highlighted and its application is constantly emphasised in practice. Corporate governance not only establishes a governance structure to distribute responsibilities and rights among different participants,but also elaborates procedures and regulations to decide business affairs, including manager’s accounting judgement on financial statements (La Portaet al., 2000). However, the financial statementsare likely to be manipulated to achieve managers’self-interests based on the agency theory (Dulipovici and Robey, 2013). Consequently, such theoretical arguments raise an alarm to investigate manager’s motivation for accounting choice and recognise corresponding impacts on financial performance.

Contents目录

1. Introduction 2
1.1. Background 2
1.2. Significance 2
1.3. Research Area & Research Question 3
2. Literature Review 4
2.1. Theoretical Level 4
2.1.1. Corporate Governance 4
2.1.2. Agency Problem 4
2.1.3. Managers’ Accounting Discretion and Financial Performance 5
2.2. Avenues for Future Research 6
3. Hypothesis 7
4. Methodology 7
4.1. Task and Procedures 7
4.2. Variables Identified in the Test 8
4.2.1. Variables of Firm’s Financial Performance 8
4.2.2. Variables of Manager’s accounting Choices on Financial Statements 8
4.3. Model Design 8
4.4. Sample 9
5. Conclusion 10
References 11

5. Conclusion总结

This research sheds light on the influence of manager’s accounting choice on firm’s financial performance with a consideration for corporate governance. Based on the failure in previous research tests towards, this research jointly use two tests in order to reveal the negative relation between manager’s accounting choices and firm’s financial performance.

References文献

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