英语论文网

Abstract摘要：

薪酬是代理理论背景下大量学术研究者的热点话题之一。代理理论中有两个相互矛盾的观点－最优契约理论和管理层权力观。因此，本文主要目的是研究通过整体金融产业绩效中CEO报酬与公司之间的联系。然后，测试是否有一些因素对补偿的影响。薪酬与企业绩效指标的信息可从2004到2009期间执行比较Compustat的数据库。在这篇文章中，OLS回归测试的实施将证明之间的联系的薪酬与公司绩效和薪酬等因素之间的关系。现金/总薪酬与公司绩效的结果显示正向关系是非常显著的。我发现公司规模和CEO薪酬杠杆起着决定性因素。CEO compensation is one of the hot topics for a large number of academic researchers under the context of agency theory. Agency theory has two contradictory views－optimal contract view and managerial power view. Therefore, the paper mainly aims toexaminethe links between CEO compensation and firm performance through the overall non-financial industry. Then, testing whether some factors have an impact on compensation. The information of compensation and firm performance indicator isavailable on Execucomp and Compustat database from the period 2004 to 2009.In this essay, an OLS regression test will be implemented to prove the links between compensation and firm performance and that between compensation and other determinants. My results show a significantly positive relationshipon both cash/total compensation and firm performance.I find Firm size and leverage are key determinants of CEO compensation.

Table of Contents
Chapter 1: Introduction 4
1.1 Background 4
1.2 Motive 5
1.3 The Purpose of the Study 5
1.4 Method 6
1.5 Frame and Structure 7
Chapter 2:Literature review and hypothesis development 8
2.1  The relative theorm 8
2.1.1  Principal Agent theory 8
2.1.2 Incentive theory 8
2.1.3 Research summery 10
2.2. Empirical evidence 12
2.3. Hypothesis development 14
Chapter 3:Large sample analysis 17
3.1:Methodology 17
3.2: Sample selection and descriptive statistics 19
3.2.1: Sample selection 19
3.2.2. Components of compensation 20
3.2.3 Descriptive statistics 22
3.3:Regression analysis and results 24
3.4:Elasticity test 30
Chapter 4: Small Sample study 34
4.1 Methodology 34
4.1.1 The Definition and principle of the DEA 34
4.1.2 The DEA details on the developing effects of financial enterprises 34
4.2 Description Analysis 35
4.2.1 Index Analysis 35
4.2.2 Correlation Analysis 38
4.3 DEA non-parameter anlaysis 39
Chapter 5: Summary and conclusion 43
Reference: 44

Chapter 1: Introduction介绍

1.1 Background
The relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance has always been a hot topic in academic literatures based on the problem of agency theory. The problem of agency, also called agency cost, arises from the separation of the ownership (principal) from management control (agent)(Berle and Means, 1932). Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest principals (shareholders) may not have knowledge to manage firms, and hence, they will employ another person (agent) to perform on their behalf. However, agents (managers) are likely to perform in their own interest to pursue their goals since principals and mangers have different maximum utility; for instance, managers prefer perusing the expansion of firm size, but shareholders prefer the growth of stock price. Thus,in order to keep their goal of consistency, principals appoint aboard of directors to monitor the managers’ behaviour. Fama and Jensen (1983) put emphasis that the most important function o本论文由英语论文网提供整理，提供论文代写，英语论文代写，代写论文，代写英语论文，代写留学生论文，代写英文论文，留学生论文代写相关核心关键词搜索。